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Adjustment to an external imbalance is more difficult within a monetary union if wages are 
sticky. Periods of high unemployment are usually necessary to achieve the required real 
depreciation (internal devaluation). Gradual adjustment is usually recommended to distribute 
the output and employment cost over time. This paper takes into account that gradual 
adjustment also has a cost in terms of higher current account deficits and thus a higher debt, 
and ultimately higher debt-service costs. We calculate the optimal path/speed of price and 
wage adjustment in terms of deeper parameters like the slope of the Phillips curve, the degree 
of openness, etc. Gradual adjustment is not always optimal. 
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Optimal Adjustment Paths in a Monetary Union 
Ansgar Belke and Daniel Gros* 
CEPS Working Document No. 424 / July 2016 
Introduction 
If an external devaluation (of the exchange rate) is not possible, as within the euro area, 
internal devaluation may serve as a substitute, but requires significant and politically costly 
declines in both wages and prices (Wasmer, 2012, p. 769).  
The optimal path for prices and wages involves a balance between two apparently conflicting 
objectives. One is to quickly restore competitiveness and the external balance. The other is to 
mitigate the deflationary effects resulting from an increase in the real value of private debt and 
the postponement of expenditure in case of deflation. “Debt outcomes are very sensitive to 
growth or variations in the speed of internal devaluation” (IMF, 2012, p. 90). 
Recognising the above-mentioned trade-off, labour market reforms aimed at removing 
downward wage rigidities in deficit countries are expected to contain unemployment (as 
wages will become more responsive to changes in employment) and to speed up the structural 
adjustment process towards exports. At the same time, however, such policies might also 
adversely affect consumer demand, tilting the economy away from internal balance.1  
Although they do not directly refer to an optimal pace of internal devaluation, some recent 
IMF working papers, such as those by Kang and Shambaugh (2013, 2014), Tressel et al. (2014) 
and Tressel and Wang (2014), emphasise some pattern. Above all they emphasise that the 
adjustment for the southern European countries has come along with a substantial recession, 
because unit labour cost improvements have been largely driven by falling employment, while 
much of the current account improvements have been achieved through import compression due 
to the recession (see also IMF, 2013, p. 25). For instance, there is empirical evidence that an 
                                                             
* Ansgar Belke is ad Personam Jean Monnet Chair for Macroeconomics and Director of the Institute of 
Business and Economics at the University of Duisburg-Essen, and Associate Senior Research Fellow at 
CEPS; Daniel Gros is Director of CEPS. The authors are grateful to Miguel Lebre de Freitas, Thomas 
Moutos and Francisco José Veiga for valuable comments and to Irina Dubova for excellent research 
support. 
1  In practice, relative prices are adjusting at different paces across countries and with different 
compositions of wage cuts and labour shedding. See Tressel and Wang (2014). 
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increase in the exports of programme countries might also result from a lack of domestic demand 
and hysteresis effects. In that case, firms stay in the market even if they incur losses in order 
to avoid exit and re-entry costs and thus switch from home to foreign markets (Belke, Oeking 
and Setzer, 2014). 
A different question is how fast the RER (real exchange rate) depreciation should be achieved so as 
to bring the economy to internal and external balance simultaneously. In addressing it, this 
contribution strives to balance the benefits of restoring competitiveness against the 
deflationary effect of the devaluation. Some first considerations can be found in the following 
analysis. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 1, some fundamental conceptual 
issues are clarified. Section 2 develops the macroeconomic framework with an eye on the role 
of ideology and different schools of thought. In section 3, we come up with a simple model to 
assess whether gradual adjustment or a ‘cold turkey’ approach is preferable from a social 
welfare perspective. Among others, we derive the optimum speed of internal adjustment and 
assess the welfare effects of alternative policy instruments.  
1. Towards an empirical assessment of the optimal path for internal 
devaluation 
Before going into an assessment of adjustment programmes one needs to ask why they were 
needed. Official adjustment programmes are needed (and accepted) usually when a country, 
or rather its government, has lost access to capital markets. This type of situation usually 
occurs only after a so-called ‘sudden stop’ in capital inflows. Typically the country in question 
experienced a period of high capital inflows that financed the combination of a domestic boom 
with a large current account deficit. This implies that the country needing an official 
adjustment programme has usually accumulated a considerable stock of debt and faces two 
problems when the capital inflows stop: 
 a stock problem, in that often a large proportion of the accumulated debt was short 
term and refinancing the stock might become impossible/extremely costly. Part of any 
adjustment programme is hence to re-finance pre-existing debt coming due (or to 
organise a restructuring, like in the case of Greece) (Shambaugh, 2012; Bornhorst and 
Arranz, 2013; Tressel, 2012); and  
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 a flow problem in that the current employment and production pattern has resulted in 
a current account deficit (i.e. the demand for tradables has exceeded the supply).  
Our contribution focuses on the flow problem, i.e. how and at what speed to reduce the current 
account deficit. In the absence of official financing the country does not have any choice: the 
current account deficit must disappear when the capital inflows stop. This is what countries 
like Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria experienced around 2009. More specifically, the huge 
capital inflows that had financed current account deficits of 10 to over 20% of GDP had to 
disappear within a very short period of time because financing from private sources dried up 
and these countries did not receive (or ask for) official support (Giavazzi and Spaventa, 2010). 
The cases of some of the euro area countries (and Latvia) were different. When their 
governments lost access to financing in private markets they were offered substantial financial 
support from official sources (the IMF, the European Union and the European Central Bank 
(ECB)).  
This implies that for some countries, private capital markets basically forced the economy into 
external balance, leaving governments and domestic actors with little choice. By contrast, in 
the case of those undergoing official adjustment programmes the speed of external adjustment 
becomes a policy choice – and a hotly contested one. Governments of the countries concerned 
of course prefer a slow adjustment, because this lowers the required combination of a 
reduction in domestic absorption and lower wages. The creditor countries or other institutions 
providing finance of course prefer a quicker adjustment, since this reduces the amount of risk 
they have to take. 
The real life constraint both sides face is that in the short run, a reduction in the current account 
deficit can be achieved mainly through a reduction of domestic expenditure, since domestic 
prices and wages adjust only slowly. Achieving external balance implies in the short run 
substantial costs in terms of unemployment. In the longer run, full employment can be 
restored if domestic wages and prices have fallen such that expenditure switching can work, 
through higher production of tradables and a switch in demand from imports towards 
domestically produced goods. From the point of view of the countries in crisis, slower 
adjustment is always better. However, this point of view overlooks the fact that a slower 
adjustment means that the current account deficit persists for longer, implying that in the long 
run the country has to service a higher level of external debt. Taking into account the longer 
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term budget constraint implies that the choice is not so much between slow or quick 
adjustment today, but between more adjustment today and less adjustment tomorrow 
(because more adjustment today means a lower future debt level). 
In that case, there is a trade-off between internal devaluation and unemployment: lack of RER 
depreciation implies that a greater contraction of domestic expenditure will be needed to meet 
the external balance (usually depicted in a Swan diagram). A faster RER depreciation would 
allow the economy to meet the external balance without the need to depress aggregate demand 
so much. Since the RER depreciation in a country such as Greece under the Troika 
programmes was insufficient, the aggregate demand fell more than needed, with a special 
impact on investment, dooming the economy to a slower recovery and less ability to reallocate 
resources from the non-tradable to the tradable sector. Thus, according to this view, a faster 
RER depreciation would imply less contraction, not more. There would be no two conflicting 
objectives. In that respect, in our model section 3.2 we check whether a higher degree of 
openness makes the overall adjustment less costly and, in the same vein, whether a steeper 
Phillips curve or a more elastic supply curve of exports have the same effect. 
Another argument that arises often in discussions about external adjustment is that a real 
devaluation increases the real value of debt denominated in foreign currency. This issue is 
independent of whether the devaluation is internal (when prices and wages decline) or 
external (when the nominal exchange rate depreciates). The real value of debt increases in both 
cases. And this will depress aggregate demand further. In this context, however, it is crucial 
to be precise about what is meant by an increase in the real value of debt. In the case of a 
nominal devaluation it is clear that the real value of all debt expressed in foreign currency will 
increase in terms of non-tradable goods as long as domestic prices and wages are sticky. Yet 
debt expressed in domestic currency might actually lose some of its value in terms of domestic 
goods as long as there is some, partial, flexibility in domestic prices and wages.  
Within a monetary union there is no distinction in terms of the currency of denomination of 
debt. When domestic prices and wages fall the real value of all debt, in terms of the domestic 
good, increases. Still, the value of (all) debt will remain unchanged in terms of tradable goods, 
because the home country is usually taken to be a price-taker on global markets. Moreover, 
one has to distinguish between domestic and foreign debt. The fact that the real value of 
domestic debt increases should not have a large net impact on demand, since the creditors 
gain what the debtors lose. Finally, the debt owed to foreign residents has to be ultimately 
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serviced by a transfer of tradable goods. This implies that the real depreciation required for an 
external adjustment does not necessarily increase the real burden of existing foreign debt.  
The increase in the value of all debt in terms of domestic non-tradables should not have, on 
net, an income effect, but it could exacerbate borrowing constraints. Thus, one could argue that a 
slower adjustment (i.e. a slower decline in domestic wages and prices) is a preferred strategy, 
since it leads to a reduction of borrowing constraints and thereby a smaller contraction of 
investment. In other words, with a slower adjustment in domestic wages it might be possible 
to increase the pace at which new capacity in the export sector is established, ultimately 
accelerating the external adjustment and the return to full employment.  
2. The macroeconomic framework: Ideology and different schools of thought 
As we have seen in several cases in the past, the ease with which internal adjustment can be 
implemented is influenced by the country’s overall vulnerability to adjustment and the government’s 
ability to design reforms in ways that spare its core constituency (Walter, 2014). Hence, the 
optimality of the internal adjustment path is a function of political-economic constraints (like 
government ideology) in the home country. For instance, one may argue that the lower the 
political-economic obstacles are, the more speedily the internal adjustment should take place 
(Zemanek, Belke and Schnabl, 2010). This is because it implies less reliance on (external) 
financing, which reduces the danger of even more debt-sustainability problems in the future. 
Otherwise, the necessary internal adjustment might be thwarted by interest groups, and for 
instance, the resolution of the Greek crisis will continue to be a drawn-out, painful and 
politically costly process.  
Note that even without the option of external adjustment, two additional crisis strategies 
remain, at least theoretically, for the Greek government in the current crisis besides an internal 
adjustment by the deficit countries: internal adjustment by the surplus countries and a quasi-
permanent financing of the deficit. Of course, external adjustment in terms of a depreciation 
of the euro in general (as currently enacted through quantitative easing) is also an option and 
the ECB has been actively working towards a weakening of the currency. As stated, for 
instance by Biggs and Mayer (2014), owing to more generous external (credit) assistance for 
Greece, the optimal speed of internal adjustment could be slower and become conditional on 
“optimal” external assistance and, hence, even indeterminate. Anyway, materially slower 
adjustment would have required even more support (Gros et al., 2014). A coordinated break-
6  BELKE & GROS 
up of economic and monetary union has also been considered in policy circles and academic 
research (Walter, 2014, p. 8). 
The discussion about adjustment in a monetary union has become highly politicised (in terms 
of ‘Keynesian versus non-Keynesian’) and at the same time the discussion has not taken place 
with reference to any full-fledged model. This is a key problem, since without an explicit 
framework it becomes very difficult to discriminate between different views. A formal model 
has the advantage that different views of the world can be distinguished through various 
specific restrictions and assumptions in the model. It was extremely hard to find any academic 
literature on the issue of the optimal speed of internal devaluation in the strict technical sense. 
That is somewhat surprising given that the implicit welfare function is generally taken to be 
convex in lost output or unemployment (usually the squared deviations from respective 
equilibrium values) and there are benchmark, if not consensus, macro-models that relate 
output to wages and prices in the presence of nominal rigidities. We show that the 
combination of these simple, standard elements leads to important insights.  
So what is the core of the diametrically opposed Keynesian-type argument in favour of a trade-
off between the external and internal balance? In that respect, Wren-Lewis (2012) states, “[t]he 
key macroeconomic question is how quick adjustment should be. Should competitiveness be 
restored quickly or slowly? Macroeconomics has a pretty clear answer which comes from the 
Phillips curve (of whatever variety) – slow is much more efficient” (emphasis added). 
Wren-Lewis (2015) continues the argument with an eye on Latvia: 
Now this is all very stylised and partial equilibrium, but there is one important 
message that will survive complications. The Phillips curve tells us that reducing the 
price level gradually over time is more efficient than doing it quickly [emphasis added]. So 
even if you believe that you have to stick with a fixed exchange rate, a short sharp 
recession is much less efficient than a more modest but prolonged recession. Thinking 
about the convexity of the social welfare function reinforces this point. 
As a result, even if output growth this year and next year was over 5% p.a., and the 
country achieves a sustainable level of competitiveness, I would not call the Latvian 
experience a success story. The competitiveness correction will have cost the economy 
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a huge amount in wasted resources and unemployment misery, when it could have 
achieved this correction at a much reduced cost.2  
We do not discuss how policy outside the country concerned could foster or even obviate the 
need for adjustment. For example, it has been argued that the (external and internal) 
adjustment by the deficit countries could be much reduced, in a general equilibrium 
perspective by a symmetric adjustment in the surplus countries. We take external demand as 
given and thus do not consider these general equilibrium effects. Moreover, the external 
adjustment in the euro periphery would also be facilitated by a depreciation of the euro.  
3. Gradual adjustment or cold turkey? A simple model 
A critical problem of a country facing a ‘sudden stop’ in capital inflows is the optimal speed 
of adjustment. Countries receiving only limited financial support have little choice: when 
private capital inflows stop, and official financing is very limited, they have to adjust very 
quickly in the sense that the current account must almost instantaneously go into equilibrium. 
This was the case of the Baltic countries, as shown in Gros et al. (2014).3 In the cases of the euro 
area countries under financial stress (like Greece, Ireland and Portugal), official financial 
support was relatively plentiful. There the speed of adjustment could be chosen by policy.  
The main trade-off is simple: a quick elimination of the current account deficit has the 
advantage that it avoids the accumulation of further foreign debt (which tends to be expensive 
during a crisis). However, a quick turnaround in the current account requires an immediate 
sharp reduction in domestic absorption, because it takes time to increase exports, especially if 
the country does not have a flexible exchange rate.  
At first sight, a cold turkey approach could require a sharper fall in demand and GDP than a 
more gradual approach, which would give time for domestic prices and wages to adjust so 
that higher exports could contribute to closing the external deficit, thereby sustaining demand 
and employment later. But when one takes into account that wages are likely to adjust faster 
when domestic demand is very weak, it turns out that a front-loaded adjustment improves the 
                                                             
2 For more on these arguments, see also “The case of Latvia’s ‘successful’ (speedy) internal devaluation 
is not a model for the EZ periphery” (http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/05/roubini-on-
internal-devaluation/). 
3  Note in this context that the labour markets in the Baltics were rather flexible. See Purfield and 
Rosenberg (2010). 
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prospects for the future on two accounts: foreign debt will be lower and wages will have fallen 
in the meantime, improving competitiveness.  
Our model allows one to put this trade-off into more precise terms. The key result is that the 
choice is not between gradual or rapid adjustment. With an intertemporal budget constraint 
the choice is only between adjustment today and adjustment tomorrow. 
What remains, as an argument for a gradual (or rather slower) approach, is essentially that the 
future is discounted: future pain counts for less than pain today. Whether a gradual or a cold 
turkey approach is better depends on the strength of the discount on the future, relative to the 
price of the additional foreign debt incurred in a gradual adjustment (and the amount of future 
employment created by a quick adjustment).  
The purpose of the simple model presented here is to formalise these relationships and the 
trade-off in a standard Keynesian-type model in which import demand depends on domestic 
absorption and domestic wages, which in turn react in a Phillips curve-type relationship to 
domestic demand (or rather the output gap). The model should be useful to describe the 
choices facing a member country of the euro area, or countries with a hard peg, like the Baltic 
countries whose currencies were linked to the euro. 
3.1 The model 
The purpose of our model is to capture the essential elements mentioned above. There are only 
two periods: the present and the future. The basic decision is thus only about the present 
period. We assume that policy-makers can somehow choose the state of the economy (in terms 
of the output gap) today. Once this decision has been taken, the future is determined, in the 
sense that any adjustment that has not been achieved today must come tomorrow. 
The model consists of four basic relationships or building blocks: 
1. The current account at any point in time (which is equal to the trade balance plus the 
interest payments on the accumulated foreign debt) depends on domestic demand in 
the same period and wages in the past. 
2. Wages are sluggish, but they react to unemployment or the output gap. 
3. The country faces an intertemporal budget constraint in the sense that the discounted 
sum of the trade accounts cannot surpass a certain limit (given by the availability of 
private and official financing). 
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4. Policy consists of minimising a standard social loss function. 
The basic working mechanisms start from the observation that income and the real exchange 
rate determine the current account. This is an empirical relationship that is quite robust and 
has been estimated very frequently. Although the precise parameter estimates vary a great 
deal there is general agreement in the literature about this specification. 
Formally, the first building block is a simple equation for the current account (or rather the 
trade balance given past debt): 
(1) 1 ttt wyc a b   , 
where y denotes income (which can be understood as the deviation from the equilibrium or 
trend) and cabt is the current account balance. Domestic income (in the current period) has an 
immediate impact on imports and hence the current account. Higher income of course leads 
to a deterioration of the current account (beta is positive and indicates the degree of openness 
of the economy).  
Exports, however, react to (domestic) wages, wt, only with a lag. The current account in the 
present period (cabt) is therefore a function of wages in the previous period (wt-1). The 
parameter gamma is also positive, as higher wages should mean lower exports. A higher value 
of gamma indicates a higher elasticity of export demand to the real exchange rate measured 
in relative wages (foreign wages are given and taken as constant). 
The second building block concerns the adjustment of wages. They are assumed to follow a 
standard Phillips curve-type relationship in the sense that when income is high (the output 
gap is positive) wages increase: 
(2) ttt yww   1  . 
Without loss of generality, the wage rate inherited from the previous period (wt-1) can be 
normalised to zero. As shown below, this normalisation nonetheless has implications for the 
intertemporal budget constraint.  
This mechanism for the adjustment in wages implies that the trade balance during the second 
period is given by 
(3)  . ttttt yywycab    111
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The trade balance in any period is thus a function not only of current demand conditions, but 
also, indirectly, of past ones. 
This facilitates the exposition of the third building block, namely the budget constraint. It takes 
the form of the condition that the discounted value of the external deficits incurred in the 
current period and the future period must sum to zero: 
(4) 01  tt c a bc a b  , 
where the parameter Ω denotes the interest factor by which a deficit during the first period 
increases the overall foreign debt of the country at the end of the (first) period (Ω>1). 
Using equations (1) and (3) in (4) shows how the output gaps in both periods are related, if the 
country has a ceiling on the foreign debt it can accumulate (or has to repay) over both periods: 
(5) 0 =  Ω(𝛽𝑦𝑡 +  𝛾𝜙𝑤𝑡−1) +  |𝛽𝑦𝑡+1 +  𝛾(𝜙𝑦𝑡 +  𝑤𝑡−1)| . 
The wage rate inherited from the past (wt-1) has been made explicit in this equation to show 
that a high initial wage rate corresponds with a certain level of external debt. This can be seen 
by rewriting the intertemporal budget constraint as 
(5)´ – 𝑤𝑡−1(Ω𝛾𝜙 + 𝛾) ≡ 𝐷 =  Ω𝛽𝑦𝑡 + |𝛽𝑦𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝜙𝑦𝑡| .  
A high, inherited wage rate (wt-1 > 0) is thus equivalent to having a certain amount of foreign 
debt (D < 0). We concentrate henceforth on the case of a country in need of adjustment in the 
sense that it enters the first period with a wage rate above the equilibrium level. The impact of 
this adjustment need on the external balance is summarised in the parameter D, which is 
therefore assumed to be negative. 
D does not necessarily need to be negative. In the case of a country entering the current period 
with an undervalued wage rate (wt-1 < 0), D would be positive. More generally, D can be 
thought of as the sum of the total amount of financing available for the economy. In the case 
of countries under an adjustment programme, D would be the sum of the amount of official 
financing available during the present, i.e. the first period adjusted for the negative impact of 
high initial wages.  
In the case of a country entering the first period already with foreign debt (and without the 
possibility of default), D would be negative even if the initial wage rate were at the equilibrium 
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level (wt-1 = 0), because in this case the country would need to run (on average) current account 
surpluses over the current and future period. 
For the remainder, we continue denoting D as the algebraic sum of the external financing 
available plus the impact of the initial conditions resulting from deviations of the initial wage 
rate from its equilibrium level of zero. A negative value of D denotes an initial adjustment 
need. 
The trade-off between demand today and demand tomorrow (ceteris paribus the external debt 
ceiling) is summarised by 
(6) 
1/)/(  tt yDy   .  
Higher demand today means lower demand tomorrow, because of both the cost of debt 
(omega>1) and the fact that higher demand today keeps wages up today and consequently 
reduces future exports.  
This relationship is a key insight, because it shows that a gradual adjustment involves a trade-
off between lower domestic activity today and tomorrow, not higher activity in all periods. 
The very term ‘gradual adjustment’ is actually not appropriate, since it suggests that somehow 
it is possible to have a higher average path for domestic demand than if the current account 
adjusts immediately. The intertemporal budget constraint implies that this is not possible: less 
adjustment today necessarily involves more adjustment tomorrow. 
Inspection of relationship (6) shows that a steeper Phillips curve makes the trade-off between 
today and tomorrow steeper in the sense that a given adjustment today is followed by a 
stronger rebound in the second period.  
The impact of a higher degree of openness (higher beta) on the adjustment speed is less clear. 
A higher degree of openness means that income has to fall less for any given adjustment in the 
external balance. Nevertheless, this effect works in the same way in both periods and hence 
has little direct bearing on the choice of whether to adjust today or tomorrow. But it is clear 
that a higher degree of openness reduces the amount of income reduction that is necessary for 
any given amount of the initial adjustment need as summarised by the parameter D. The 
higher the inherited adjustment need (or inherited debt), the lower will be the level of income 
(or output gap) that can be maintained (over both periods). 
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To simplify the notation it is convenient to summarise the influence of various parameters in 
equation (6): 
(7)   1/  tt yyD   ,  
with |Ω +
𝛾𝜙
𝛽
| ≡Γ ≻ 1. 
The composite parameter, capital gamma, is larger than one because the trade-off between 
today and tomorrow is greater than one to one. More specifically, ‘austerity’, interpreted as a 
reduction in current demand, yields a double benefit in the future: lower debt-servicing costs 
(because of a lower external deficit today) and higher exports (because wages will have 
become more competitive). 
The two parameters γ and 𝜙 always appear together because the indirect impact of lower 
demand on the (future) current account depends on both the slope of the Phillips curve and 
the elasticity of exports with respect to wages. 
The constraint resulting from the external budget restriction and the working of the economy 
does not allow one, per se, to make any inferences about what policy should do. It only shows 
the trade-off between the two periods. 
The fourth building block concerns the policy problem, which is to minimise the present value 
of the social loss from the (unavoidable) adjustment. The social loss is modelled in a standard 
way: 
(8) 
2
1
2 )()(


tt
yyL  , 
where Θ represents the degree of preference for the present of the social planner, with Θ>1. In 
a crisis situation, when risk premia are high one can assume that the market interest rate is 
higher than the social discount rate, and thus that Θ<Ω. It is under these circumstances that an 
adjustment programme makes sense. 
Note that it is implicitly assumed that yt is a policy variable. The government of course cannot 
determine demand directly, but it is assumed here that fiscal policy (austerity) has a direct 
impact on demand.  
The rate of interest and time preference of course play an important role in any intertemporal 
problem. That is the case in this model as well. We show later how any difference between the 
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cost of funds for the country and the degree of time preference of the policy-makers affects the 
optimal time path. 
Finally, we note that in any model with a Philips curve-type relationship one cannot emphasise 
only wages as the driver of the trade balance, since the Philips curve implies that wages are 
ultimately driven by domestic demand.  
3.2 The optimal speed of adjustment 
Minimising the social loss with respect to yt, subject to the intertemporal budget constraint 
yields the standard first-order condition (FOC): 
(9)    0/22)(2)(2 11 









 tt
t
t
tt
t
yDy
y
y
yy
y
L
  , 
where the second equality sign is based on the relationship between income today and the 
future from equation (7). This can then be simplified to 
(10)     0/2  Dyt  . 
This equation can be solved for the income in the present period, which minimises the social 
loss, yt,min socloss : 
(11) 
 2min, 



D
y soclosst  . 
As expected, the best (or rather unavoidable) choice is to keep the current period income low 
if there is an initial over-valuation (D<0, or equivalently, if wt-1 > 0). The reverse is also true: a 
reduction of the debt, as in the Greek default (also euphemistically called PSI (private sector 
involvement)) operation of 2012, would increase D (make it less negative), allowing for a 
higher income level to be maintained. Equation (11) confirms that for a country without any 
adjustment need (D=0) the output gap should be maintained at zero. 
This result (11) only shows the amount of adjustment during the current period. The important 
issue to be addressed here, however, is the time path of adjustment, i.e. income today versus 
income tomorrow.  
Substituting the result for the current income that minimises the social loss (equation (10)) into 
the relationship between income today and in the future from the external budget constraint 
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yields a result for the optimal path of adjustment, i.e. the difference between the output gap 
in the two periods:4 
(12)
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This equation confirms that the output gap should be zero in both periods if there is no initial 
adjustment need (D=0). But if there is an adjustment need (D<0), the numerator of the fraction 
in equation (12) suggests that the second period output gap is likely to be smaller (in absolute 
value) than the one in the first period. This implies that ‘gradual’ adjustment (defined as a 
policy under which the output gap is either stable or slowly increasing) is not an optimal 
policy. A sufficient, but not necessary condition for this result is that the cost of debt is higher 
than the discount factor in the social loss function (Ω>Θ). This is likely to be the case, since in 
a crisis risk premia are usually elevated for a country with an adjustment need (and a fortiori 
for a country that needs an adjustment programme, which becomes necessary only when the 
risk premia are so high as to preclude market access).  
The optimal policy described in equation (12) does not imply a cold turkey approach either if 
one defines cold turkey as a policy under which the output gap is so negative in the first 
(adjustment) period that it can later become positive on the back of very competitive wage 
rates. Equation (11) together with equation (7) implies that if D is negative, the output gap 
should be negative in both periods. 
The main result is that even if one takes into account the convexity of social loss functions and 
preference for later adjustment, one still finds that a certain initial overshooting in the 
adjustment remains preferable in the sense that the optimal output gap during the adjustment 
period is likely to be larger than the one in the following one. 
Turning to the general case (in which D does not have to be negative), one can calculate the 
ratios of the output gaps in the two periods from the equations (11) and (7), which describe 
respectively social preferences and the intertemporal trade-off resulting from the budget 
constraint: 
                                                             
4 One needs to use (11) in (7) and solve for yt+1 and yt. 
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This result shows that the adjustment should be distributed over the two periods in a 
proportion, which is determined by the ratio of the time preference parameter in the social 
loss function to the other parameters of the economy. The bigger the weight is of the present 
in the social loss function (the higher capital theta), the more of the adjustment that will be 
postponed to the future. The level of external debt accumulation determines the level of 
income that can be maintained in both periods, but does not influence the ratio or the speed 
of adjustment. 
The result (13) also implies that a higher cost of financing external deficits during the 
adjustment period (a higher value of capital omega) should encourage a stronger initial 
adjustment if D is negative. A more open economy (a higher value of beta) also implies an 
incentive to postpone the adjustment as well as a higher elasticity of export revenue with 
respect to wage costs (a higher value of gamma) or a steeper Phillips curve. 
3.3 Alternative policy instruments 
So far it has been assumed that the only policy instrument was ‘austerity’, i.e. depressing 
demand to lower imports and wages. The fiscal consolidations that had to be undertaken in 
the peripheral countries were in many cases achieved through tax increases. This raises the 
issue of which taxes should have been increased. 
Increasing direct taxes could be seen as particularly inappropriate because exporters have to 
operate in the formal economy and might de facto be the one sector that actually feels an 
increase in effective taxation (whereas the non-tradable, often informal sector might be able to 
evade higher income tax rates). This would imply an increase in effective wage costs in the 
tradable sector, which could be modelled as w(1+tax), where ‘tax’ indicates the increase in the 
tax rate during the second period. The external debt ceiling would then be satisfied by 
(5)’ taxyyytD tt    )( 1  . 
The trade-off between demand today and demand tomorrow (given the external debt ceiling), 
would then worsen to 
(6)’ 1//)/(  tt ytaxDy   . 
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The fall in domestic demand, ceteris paribus, would have to be stronger. Still, this modification 
would not affect the incentives to push the adjustment into the future. The debt ceiling would 
be increased (in absolute value) by the impact of the shift of the implicit export supply 
equation, but the relation between income today and tomorrow in equation (13) would not be 
affected. 
The same should also hold true of any exogenous wage reduction. The labour market reforms 
contained in the adjustment programme could be interpreted in two ways: some of the 
measures contained cuts in the public sector and in minimum wages (presumably, mainly for 
the private sector). Given that any change in minimum wages has an impact on other wages 
as well, this could be interpreted as an attempt to engineer an exogenous reduction in wages. 
In this model, that should have allowed a higher demand level to be maintained in both 
periods, but would not have affected the optimal speed of adjustment.  
Other aspects of the labour market reforms, such as changes in wage bargaining systems, 
could be interpreted as making the Phillips curve steeper. As shown above this would 
strengthen the case for an immediate adjustment in demand (or austerity), because the payoff 
from a stronger fall in demand today in terms of lower wages would be stronger the steeper 
the Phillips curve. 
3.4 Reducing the overall cost of adjustment 
The overall cost of adjustment can be calculated in terms of the social loss function, which can 
be rewritten as 
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Using the relationship (13), which determines the optimal speed of adjustment, and the 
formula for the loss-minimising income in the current period (equation (11)) yields 
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This equation can be used to determine the influence of parameters on the overall costs of 
adjustment. 
Recall that Γ =  Ω+  
𝛾𝜙
𝛽
> 1. 
It follows that a higher degree of openness (a higher beta) makes the overall adjustment less 
costly. A steeper Phillips curve (or a more elastic supply curve of exports) also makes the 
overall adjustment less costly.  
This might explain, at least partially, the different choices of Latvia and Portugal, for example. 
Latvia is much more open than Portugal and its wages reacted strongly to the crisis (Gros et 
al., 2014). 
Moreover, the emphasis on labour market reforms in the euro area adjustment programmes 
was justified in the sense that a steeper Phillips curve reduces the cost of adjustment. Yet it is 
also clear from our analysis that labour market reforms can only reduce, not eliminate, the 
adjustment costs that arise when the economy has to switch resources from the domestic to 
the tradables sector. 
Conclusions 
This paper provides a framework to think about the optimal path of adjustment for a country, 
which starts the current period with either a large foreign debt or a wage rate above the level 
that would allow for external balance at full employment. 
Modelling this situation allows one to show which parameters would justify a quick 
adjustment. 
The question of the optimal path for prices and wages involves a balance between two 
apparently conflicting objectives. One is to restore competitiveness and the external balance, 
focusing on exports as the driver of growth. The other is the loss of output and employment 
that result from depressing demand during the adjustment.  
Most policy evaluations of the adjustment process in the euro periphery have concentrated on 
the high cost in terms of unemployment, arguing that a slower pace of adjustment would have 
involved lower costs. However, this line of argument does not take into account that a slower 
adjustment (in terms of less unemployment and hence less of a fall in wages) also leads to a 
slower external adjustment, burdening the country with a higher foreign debt. A simple model 
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with an intertemporal budget constraint shows immediately that gradual adjustment is not a 
free lunch, but has its costs in higher future debt service.  
One key result of our simple model is that a fairly rapid adjustment is optimal even allowing 
for the usual convexity of social loss functions in the output gap and a preference for later 
adjustment. Under the most likely parameter constellations, we find that bringing most, but 
not all, of the adjustment forward would be a policy that minimises the social loss.  
Our model thus supports the general thrust of the adjustment programmes in the euro area 
periphery. A front-loaded fiscal adjustment was needed not only because of unsustainable 
initial positions, but also because a strong dose of initial austerity tended to support the wage 
adjustment, thereby accelerating the external adjustment and thus leading to a lower debt level 
the country had to support at the end of the adjustment period. The most successful example 
of this approach was of course Latvia, where the fall in GDP was sharpest, but also the shortest. 
In Portugal, Spain and Italy, by contrast, the initial fall in GDP was much more contained, but 
the recovery also took much longer. It seems that a quick adjustment did pay off.  
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